Roberts v. Johnson-A Welcome Change Tainted
By An Outmoded Approach To Statutory
Interpretation
In 1974, the Washington State Legislature repealed its automobile guest statute,' intending to establish ordinary negligence
as the proper standard of liability in host-guest automobile tort
actions.' Nevertheless, in March 1978, in Lau v. Nelson,3 the
Washington Supreme Court, ignoring clear indicia of legislative
intent, held that the repeal of the guest statute revived the common law of this state, which, like the guest statute, predicated a
guest's recovery on proving the host grossly negligent. Having
effectively reinstated the very law the legislature repealed, the
Lau court declined to decide whether the majority rule of ordinary negligence' should replace Washington's common law rule
of gross negligence.'
In December 1978, in Roberts v. Johnson,6 the court resolved
that issue by overruling Lau and abandoning gross negligence in
favor of ordinary negligence as the applicable standard of liability. This laudatory and long overdue result was tainted, however,
by the court's specific reaffirmation of Lau's holding that the
repeal of a statute reinstates the common law regardless of the
legislative intent behind the repeal. The court's failure to ascertain and implement the legislative intent is the unfortunate manifestation of a rigid, insensitive, and rule-oriented approach to
statutory interpretation.7
1. Act of Feb. 11, 1974, ch. 3. § 1, 1974 Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 2 (repealed 1974).
2. See text accompanying notes 40-42 infra.
3. 89 Wash. 2d 772, 575 P.2d 719 (1978).
4. Under the majority rule, an automobile driver, like the driver of a horse and buggy,
owed a duty of ordinary care for the safety of his guest. See, e.g., Beard v. Klusmeier, 158
Ky. 153, 164 S.W. 319 (1914). This is now the common law standard in 49 states including
Washington. See generally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 16.15 (1956).
Georgia is the only remaining jurisdiction adhering to a common law requirement of gross
negligence. See note 71 infra.
5. Because Lau v. Nelson came before the court on discretionary review, the court
limited its inquiry to two issues: (1) whether the courts were to give the repealing act a
retroactive or prospective application; and (2) whether the repeal of the guest statute
reinstated the common law rule of this jurisdiction predicating recovery on a finding of
gross negligence.
6. 91 Wash. 2d 182, 588 P.2d 201 (1978) (This case was misspelled in the advance
sheets as Robberts v. Johnson. The error will be corrected in the bound volume of Washington Reports.).
7. Becausb the Lau court revived gross negligence rather than implementing the
legislative intent behind the repeal of the guest statute, Vivian Lau was denied a cause
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In June 1977, Debbra Roberts instituted an action in the
Superior Court for Yakima County8 to recover damages for injuries sustained while riding in an automobile owned and operated
by Randall Johnson. The trial court granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment because his conduct did not constitute
gross negligence. The supreme court reversed the trial court,
thereby overruling Lau and a long line of cases predicating a
guest's recovery on a finding of gross negligence. 0
In the 1926 decision of Heiman v. Kloizner," the Washington
Supreme Court first addressed the question of a host driver's
liability to his guest. The court held that an automobile driver
must exercise a higher degree of care for the safety of a guest than
for the safety of a mere trespasser, but a lesser degree of care than
that required for the safety of a passenger for hire. Shortly after
Heiman, Saxe v. Terry" established Washington's common law
requirement of gross negligence. Although Heiman did not definitely establish the required standard of care, the Saxe court
interpreted Heiman as requiring a showing of gross negligence
before an invited guest could recover. 3 The Saxe court offered no
analysis, however, and logic does not support its conclusion.
Recognizing three standards of care, Saxe defined gross negof action that today would be valid under Roberts. It is unfortunate that the court's
approach to statutory interpretation resulted in such an inequity.
8. Roberts v. Johnson, No. 77-2-00729-6 (Super. Ct. Yakima County Mar. 2, 1978).
9. In granting summary judgment, the court concluded that: (1) the appellant was a
non-paying guest of the respondent; (2) the common law of the state of Washington
required gross negligence on the part of the respondent; and (3) the actions of respondent
would not support a finding of gross negligence. Id.
10. See, e.g., Brewer v. Copeland, 86 Wash. 2d 58, 542 P.2d 445 (1975); Ketchum v.
Wood, 73 Wash. 2d 335, 438 P.2d 596 (1968); Osborn v. Chapman, 62 Wash. 2d 495, 384
P.2d 117 (1963); Meath v. Northern Pac. Ry., 179 Wash. 177, 36 P.2d 533 (1934); Connolly
v. Derby, 167 Wash. 286, 9 P.2d 93 (1932); Saxe v. Terry, 140 Wash. 503, 250 P. 27 (1926);
Heiman v. Kloizner, 139 Wash. 655, 247 P. 1034 (1926).
11. 139 Wash. 655, 247 P. 1034 (1926).
12. 140 Wash. 503, 250 P. 27 (1926). The court held that an automobile driver was
liable to an invited guest only for gross negligence. Additionally, the court held that the
evidence was insufficient to establish gross negligence where it appeared the defendant
was on a hunting trip, anxious to reach the hunting ground as soon as possible, and when
approaching a curve before daylight at a speed of 25 miles an hour, skidded on a wet road
and went into a ditch.
13. The court stated:
That opinion [Heiman] does not definitely fix the degree of lack of care which
must be shown by an invited guest before liability will result. It holds that that
degree is somewhere between that required where the carriage is one for hire and
that necessary to be exercised with reference to the safety of a mere trespasser.
From that it must follow that before an invited guest can recover a showing of
gross negligence is necessary.
Id. at 507, 250 P. at 28.

410

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 2:408

ligence as the want of slight care, ordinary negligence as the want
of ordinary care, and slight negligence as the want of great care. 4
Applying these standards to the Heiman holding, the requisite
care would lie somewhere between that required for the care of a
passenger for hire 5 and that required for the care of a mere trespasser; 6 that is, somewhere between great care and slight care.
The area between these two extremes is some species of ordinary
care. Under the Saxe court's own definition, then, want of ordinary care results in ordinary negligence and, although varying
degrees of ordinary negligence may exist, 7 common logic precludes the inclusion of gross negligence.
The court did not recognize this error in judicial reasoning
until Roberts. In Roberts, Justice Rosellini indicated the Saxe
court, in assuming that a paid carrier was obligated to exercise
no more than ordinary care for the safety of its passengers, misconceived the rule with respect to the liability of a carrier for hire,
which requires the highest degree of care.' 8 "Had the court had
the correct rule in mind, there would have been no obstacle to the
adoption of the requirement of ordinary care in the host-guest
situation."' 9
The Roberts court indicated that however mistakenly Washington's common law rule was conceived, the court should not
abandon it and adopt the majority rule of ordinary care without
14. Id.
15. Washington common law requires a common carrier for hire to use the highest
degree of care for the safety of passengers. See, e.g., Benjamin v. City of Seattle, 74 Wash.
2d 832, 447 P.2d 172 (1968); Boyd v. City of Edmonds, 64 Wash. 2d 94, 390 P.2d 706 (1964);
Fleming v. Red Top Cab Co., 133 Wash. 338, 233 P. 639 (1925); Southhard v. Seattle Elec.
Co., 71 Wash. 434, 128 P. 1063 (1912).
16. Washington common law indicates that a property owner owes no duty to a
trespasser except to refrain from willful and intentional injury. See, e.g., Winter v. Mackner, 68 Wash. 2d 943, 416 P.2d 453 (1966); Gasch v. Rounds, 93 Wash. 317, 160 P. 962
(1916); Barnhardt v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 89 Wash. 304, 154 P. 441 (1916); Evans v.
Miller, 8 Wash. App. 364, 507 P. 2d 887 (1973).
17. See W. PaosSEa, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTS § 33 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROsSER].
18. See note 15 supra. Although this explanation would account for the erroneous
conclusion reached in Saxe, it is difficult to believe that the Washington Supreme Court
was unaware of the duty a common carrier owed its passengers. This is especially true
considering three of the justices concurring in Saxe also concurred in Fleming v. Red Top
Cab Co., 133 Wash. 338, 233 P. 693 (1925), which established the standard of care for a
common carrier one year earlier. A more plausible explanation might be that the Saxe
court believed a common carrier owed the highest standard of care to its passengers and
a landowner owed no affirmative duty to a trespasser. Under this dichotomy, slight care
would fall between that care owed a passenger for hire (great care) and that care owed to
a mere trespasser (no care).
19. 91 Wash. 2d at 185, 588 P.2d at 203.
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inquiring into the validity of the majority rule as a rational standard of liability. In analyzing the rationality of the majority rule,
the court noted one should consider the nature of the activity to
which the rule relates. Acknowledging the operation of a motor
vehicle is a dangerous undertaking, the court emphasized that
aside from the former guest statute, no other ordinance or statute
condones the exercise of less than ordinary care in the operation
of motor vehicles.
Recognizing the need for consistency, the court stressed that,
in addition to legislation requiring ordinary care in the operation
of motor vehicles, the developing common law of Washington also
recognizes the duty of ordinary care in any activities that may
create an unreasonable risk of harm to others. The court noted
that where a landowner's activities create an unreasonable
risk of harm, a duty exists to exercise reasonable care to avoid
injuring a person permissibly on the land whose presence is or
should be known to the landowner. 0 Accordingly, the court
reasoned that if a landowner as host has a duty to exercise
reasonable care toward a guest on the host's premises, then a host
owes that same duty to a passenger in his automobile where the
risk of harm is ordinarily much greater. In so holding, the court
has placed an automobile host's duty within the common bounds
of civil responsibility.
The court noted that adopting a standard of ordinary care
necessitated overruling Lau v. Nelson2 only to the extent Lau
applied the rule of gross negligence: "Insofar as it held that the
repeal of a statute restores the rule at common law, however, the
opinion was correct and is reaffirmed." 22 In reaffirming Lau on
this ground, the court perpetuated an egregious error in statutory
interpretation by failing to effectuate the legislative intent behind the 1974 repeal of Washington's guest statute.
In Lau, Justice Rosellini, without supporting authority, indicated the repeal of Washington's guest statute revived the common law of this state which, like the guest statute, predicated a
guest's recovery on a showing of gross negligence. 23 Apparently
20. Id. at 186, 588 P.2d at 203. See also Potts v. Amis, 62 Wash. 2d 777, 384 P.2d
825 (1963). In Memel v. Reimer, 85 Wash. 2d 685, 538 P.2d 517 (1975), the court held that
a possessor of land has a duty to exercise reasonable care towards licensees on his property
with respect to any known dangerous condition when he can reasonably anticipate the
licensee will not discover the condition or realize its risks; this duty is met by either
warning the licensee of the danger or making the condition safe.
21. 89 Wash. 2d 772, 575 P.2d 719 (1978).
22. 91 Wash. 2d at 188, 588 P.2d at 203.
23. 89 Wash. 2d at 776, 575 P.2d at 721-22.
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the court relied on the maxim laid down in State v. Frater24 that
"the legislative repeal of a statute which is merely declaratory of
the common law,25 in the absence of a new statute stating some
other rule, leaves the common law in effect. 2' 6 Frater,however,

recognized that the revival of the common law was consistent
with the legislative intent" behind the repealing statute there in
question.2 This deference to legislative intent was implicit in the
rule set forth in Frater and, therefore, the rule was inapplicable
to the situation in Lau because the legislative intent clearly opposed reinstatement of the common law rule." Additionally, the
Lau holding suggests the legislature acted needlessly in repealing
the guest-host statute in 1974 when the repeal would have no
effect on the law. Such a suggestion conflicts with the presumption that a legislature does not engage in unnecessary or meaningless legislation."
24. 18 Wash. 2d 546, 140 P.2d 272 (1943). Although the Lau court cited no authority
for the proposition that the repeal of a statute revives the common law, the briefs for
petitioner, respondent and amicus curiae relied on Frater.Brief for Petitioner at 25, Brief
for Respondent at 20-21, Brief of Amicus Curiae at 11-12, Lau v. Nelson, 89 Wash. 2d 772,
575 P.2d 719 (1978).
25. The Washington Supreme Court has held on several occasions that Washington's
guest statute is a codification of the common law. See, e.g., Lau v. Nelson, 89 Wash. 2d
772, 575 P.2d 719 (1978); Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936). On other
occasions, however, the court has indicated that the guest statute is in derogation of the
common law. See, e.g., Brown v. Gamble, 60 Wash. 2d 376, 374 P.2d 151 (1962) (since
the guest statute is in derogation of the common law it is to be strictly construed); Miller
v. Treat, 57 Wash. 2d 524, 358 P.2d 143 (1960) (the host-guest statute is in derogation of
the common law and, therefore, must be strictly construed). In these latter cases the court
was apparently referring to the majority common law rule, which, unlike Washington's
common law rule, predicated liability on ordinary negligence.
26. 18 Wash. 2d at 553, 140 P.2d at 275 (footnote added).
27. One author defines legislative intent as
[wihat the moving parties behind the statute subjectively intended to say by
the language they used. The term should be distinguished from "legislative
purpose," with which it is commonly confused and which should be used to refer
only to the ulterior purpose of the statute. It is coextensive, therefore, with
immediate legislative purpose, the purpose that the statute is designed to immediately accomplish. The term is also used to refer to the intent that is objectively
manifested; that is, apparent legislative intent.

R.

DiCKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPuCATION OF STATUTES 285 (1975).

28. The court stated: "It would seem that the legislature by making this change in
the statute, deemed that no occasion existed for reenactment of the former section 1672
.
18 ..
Wash. 2d at 555, 140 P.2d at 276. Therefore, the rule in Fratershould read:
the legislative repeal of a statute which is merely declaratory of the common law, in the
absence of a statute stating some other rule, leaves the common law in effect, provided
there is no legislative intent to the contrary.
29. See text accompanying notes 40-42 infra.
30. State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977) (it is presumed that the
legislature does not engage in unnecessary or meaningless legislation); Knowles v. Holly,
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The Lau court recognized petitioner's argument that the legislature, in repealing the guest statute, intended to substitute,
not the common law rule of this jurisdiction, but rather the rule
followed in the majority of jurisdictions requiring only a showing
of ordinary negligence. Conceding the court followed the minority
view when it adopted a standard of slight care, Justice Rosellini
stated that nothing in the language of the repealing act disclosed
an intent to adopt some other rule because "[sluch an intent
could have been expressed only by an amendatory act. ''3 ' Nevertheless, because a repealing act 3 is as much a piece of positive
legislation as the statute it rescinds, the court's search for legislative intent cannot stop with the language of the act. The primary
purpose behind all statutory interpretation is to ascertain and
effectuate the intent of the legislature .33 The first and best source
from which to ascertain the meaning of a statute is the text of the
act.3 ' In construing a repealing statute,15 however, intrinsic aids3
82 Wash. 2d 694, 513 P.2d 18 (1973); Roza Irrigation Dist. v. State, 80 Wash. 2d 633, 497
P.2d 166 (1972).
31. 89 Wash. 2d at 776, 575 P.2d at 772 (emphasis added). This statement indicates
that no amount of legislative history illustrating an intent to abandon gross negligence as
a standard of liability would suffice in the absence of an explicit textual statement.
Although the Virginia legislature, under similar circumstances, had the insight to amend
its guest statute to ordinary negligence, VA. CoDE § 8.01-63 (1977), an amendatory act
should not be the only way of accomplishing that goal. Such an assertion is inconsistent
with the court's primary obligation to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent behind the statute. See note 33 infra.
32. Black's Law Dictionary defines a repeal as "[tihe abrogation or annulling of a
previously existing law by the enactment of a subsequent statute which declares that the
former law shall be revoked and abrogated .
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1463 (rev. 4th
ed. 1968).
33. See, e.g., Purse Seine Vessel Owners Ass'n v. Moos, 88 Wash. 2d 799, 567 P.2d
205 (1977) (statutes must be interpreted in accordance with the intent of the legislature)
(Rosellini, J., writing for the court); Dominick v. Christensen, 87 Wash. 2d 25, 548 P.2d
541 (1976) (the primary objective of statutory construction is to carry out the intent of
the legislature) (Rosellini, J., concurring); Hartman v. Washington State Game Comm'n,
85 Wash. 2d 176, 532 P.2d 614 (1975) (the essential objective in interpreting the meaning
of a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature) (Rosellini, J.,
concurring); Amburn v. Daly, 81 Wash. 2d 241, 501 P.2d 178 (1972) (in construing revised
statutes and connected acts of repeal, the court is obligated to observe great caution to
avoid giving an effect to the acts not contemplated by the legislature); Grafell v. Honeysuckle, 30 Wash. 2d 390, 191 P.2d 858 (1948); Lynch v. Department of Labor & Indus., 19
Wash. 2d 802, 145 P.2d 265 (1944); McKenzie v. Mukilteo Water Dist., 4 Wash. 2d 103,
102 P.2d 251 (1940). See also E. CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCION § 158 (1940); R.
DICKERSON,

supra note 27, at 13.

34. See E. CRAWFORD, supra note 33, at § 203; R. DICKERSON, supra note 27, at 104.
See ilso Behrens v. Commercial Water Dist., 107 Wash. 155, 191 P. 892 (1919).
35. See note 32 supra.
36. Intrinsic aids are those derived solely from the statute. They include the words,
grammar, punctuation, title, definition sections, and interpretation clauses. See E.
CRAWFORD, supra note 33, at § 203.
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to interpretation normally are nonexistent. When intrinsic aids
are of limited assistance, the court may look to extrinsic aids, 7
such as legislative 39history and the social context in which the
statute is enacted.
Several statements made during the recorded discussion in
the House Judiciary Committee reveal an intent to abandon gross
negligence as the applicable standard of liability in host-guest
cases. These statements, summarized and recorded in the committee's bill report, indicate the principle argument supporting
the repeal of the guest statute was that "by removing the hostguest statute, you remove an unfair obstacle for relief for accident
victims." 40 Although awkwardly phrased, the following statement, made during the committee hearing, supports the assertions contained in the committee report:
The primary concern that initiated this bill was judicially from
a constitutional standpoint in the California Supreme Court, as
well as local courts and legislatures, to recognize that the possibility of fraud in some instances does not justify deprivation of
a cause of action to people who generally deserve a cause of
action. 41

Although this statement does not carry the same probative
weight as the statements contained in the committee report,4 2 the
two, taken together, strongly indicate an intent to change the law
by removing the gross negligence requirement.
37. Extrinsic aids consist of evidence of legislative intent, purpose, or meaning that
is outside the text of the statute. See R. DICKERSON, supra note 27, at 284.
38. Ample precedent exists in Washington common law to support judicial inquiry
into legislative history. See, e.g., Lynch v. Department of Labor & Indus., 19 Wash. 2d
802, 145 P.2d 265 (1944); Ayers v. City of Tacoma, 6 Wash. 2d 545, 108 P.2d 348 (1940);
Shelton Hotel Co. v. Bates, 4 Wash. 2d 498, 104 P.2d 478 (1940); State v. Superior Court,
70 Wash. 545, 127 P. 120 (1912).
39. See, e.g., State v. Brotherhood of Friends, 41 Wash. 2d 133, 146, 247 P. 2d 787,
795 (1952); Linn v. Reid, 114 Wash. 609, 196 P. 13 (1921).
40. STAFF OF HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., 43d WASH. LEOIs. Sass., 3d Ex. SEss., REPORT
ON S. 2046 (1974).
41. Hearings on S. 2046 before House Judiciary Committee, 43d Wash. Legis. Seass.,
3d Ex. Sess. (1974) (statement by Rep. Kelly).
Traditionally, proponents advance two reasons justifying the host-guest rule. First,
they assert that drivers who gratuitously offer their hospitality should be protected from
suits by ungrateful guests, and, second, they argue that the host-guest rule aids in eliminating the possibility of collusive lawsuits in which the host fraudulently confesses negligence to permit a guest passenger to recover from the host's liability insurance carrier.
See Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 112, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973); Brewer v.
Copeland, 86 Wash. 2d 58, 63, 542 P.2d 445, 449 (1975); Lascher, Hard Laws Make Bad
Cases-Lots of Them, 9 SANTA CLARA LAw. 1, 15 (1968).
42. See text accompanying notes 50-53 infra.
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Nevertheless, to accord these statements any probative
weight, the court must find them reliable. Generally, the most
persuasive element of legislative history is the legislative committee report recommending the statute's enactment. 3 The United
States Supreme Court has noted that a "committee report represents the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation."" Accordingly, federal courts often resort to the reports of
standing committees to ascertain legislative intent. 5 At the state
level, legislatures do not routinely make formal committee reports. To the extent committee reports are available, however,
state courts now tend to permit their use to aid statutory interpretation. 6 Although Washington has begun to record legislative histories, the supreme court has not ruled directly on the probative
value of state committee reports. Nevertheless, because committee reports are considered the most persuasive indicia of legislative intent," and because the Washington Supreme Court has
8 the
recognized its obligation to implement that intent,"
court
should find the statements contained in the House Judiciary
Committee's report highly probative indications of an intent to
establish ordinary negligence as the applicable standard of liabil49
ity.
Although committee reports are among the more reliable
sources of legislative intent, 50 some doubt exists as to whether the
committee hearings and debates should receive equal probative
weight. The courts of several states5' use discussions before committees as aids in determining legislative intent. In at least one
state, 5 however, statements by members of the committee as to
43. See note 45 infra and accompanying text. See also G. FOLSOM, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY

33 (1972).

44. Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969).
45. See, e.g., Housing Auth. of Omaha v. United States Hous. Auth., 468 F.2d 1 (8th
Cir. 1972) (committee reports have been said to be the most persuasive indicia of congres-

sional intent). See also C.

SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 48.06 n.1 (4th

ed. 1973).
46. See, e.g., State v. Chase, 224 Or. 112, 355 P.2d 631 (1960); Mullis v. Celanese
Corp., 234 S.C. 380, 108 S.E.2d 547 (1959).
47. See note 45 supra.
48. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
49. See note 69 infra.
50. Other reliable sources of legislative intent include special committee reports,
conference committee reports, and the reports of commissions to revise statutes. C. SANDS,
supra note 45, at §§ 48.07-.09.
51. See, e.g., Sato v. Hall, 191 Cal. 510, 217 P. 520 (1923); Kuperschmid v. Globe
Brief Case Corp., 185 Misc. 748, 58 N.Y.S.2d 71 (App. Div. 1945).
52. Peck v. Fanion, 124 Conn. 549, 1 A.2d 143 (1938).
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their understanding of a proposition are inadmissible. One reason
for this aversion is the questionable reliability of the statement
because of the state's inability to maintain official records of the
hearings. 53 At the federal level, however, the government maintains official verbatim records of committee hearings. Consequently, federal courts recognize statements by members of the
committee as indicative of legislative intent.54 Although Washington has not ruled definitively on the probative value of committee hearings, nothing should prevent the court from taking the
position of the federal courts because the Washington Legislature
recorded and transcribed the hearing in question. 5 Therefore,
both the committee report and the hearing transcript offer probative evidence of an intent wholly inconsistent with the court's
revival of gross negligence. 6
Furthermore, the court's adherence to its position concerning
revival is especially specious considering the court's acknowledgement of legislative disinterest in the continuation of the standard
of gross negligence. Logically, it is difficult to comprehend how
the Washington Supreme Court can acknowledge an obligation to
effectuate legislative intent,5 7 recognize that intent, 5 and then
53. See, e.g., Litchfield v. City of Bridgeport, 103 Conn. 565, 131 A. 560 (1925); State
v. Blake, 69 Conn. 64, 36 A. 1019 (1897). See also C. SANDS, supra note 45, at § 48.10.
54. See, e.g., Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971);
Mastro Plastic Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
55. Because many major committees only recently began taping their committee
hearings, there is a paucity of pre-1974 legislative history. The bill in question, Senate Bill
2046, went through the Senate Judiciary Committee a few months before the committee
commenced taping those meetings. The Bill, however, also went through the House Judiciary Committee which recorded and transcribed the meeting.
56. The Lau court not only failed to effectuate the legislative intent pertaining to the
applicable standard of liability, but also failed to ascertain such intent when it held that
the repealing act would be given a retroactive application. During the second reading of
the repealing act on the floor of the Senate, Senator Woody discussed retroactivity. Addressing Senator Francis, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Woody
inquired for the record as to whether this act would have any retroactive effect. Senator
Francis responded:
ITIhere is no express intention in the bill to have it apply to any occurrence
which took place before the effective date of the act and accordingly I would
have to relate it back to general law which is, I think, quite clear that the law
in force at the time of an event is the law which applies, and accordingly I see
no basis upon which it could be given any retroactive effect.
SENATE JOURNAL, 3d Ex. SEss. 65. This response indicates the drafter's clear
WASH.
1974
intention that the repealing act was to operate prospectively rather than retrospectively.
57. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
58. The court implicitly recognized legislative intent when making the following
statements: (1) "we decline to abandon a standard of liability which has been consistently
adhered to and has, until the 1974 repeal, enjoyed legislative approval," Lau v. Nelson,
89 Wash. 2d 772, 776-77, 575 P.2d 719, 722 (1978); (2) "[iut is not unreasonable to assume
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revive a rule of law inconsistent with such intent. Unfortunately,
in reaffirming Lau on the point of revival, the Washington Supreme Court has done just that.
Apart from a thorough analysis of the available legislative
history, the court must also give great weight and serious consideration to contemporary facts and circumstances surrounding the
repeal. 9 In recent years, both commentators and the courts have
questioned the legitimacy of guest statutes.10 Accordingly, courts
and legislatures across the nation either have repealed' or declared unconstitutional"2 fifteen of the existing twenty-seven
guest statutes. Furthermore, no state has enacted a guest statute
or similar provision since 1939.3 Thus, the national trend is toward a limitation on the applicability of guest statutes. Locally,
the Washington Legislature 4 considered the repealing act a companion measure to the comparative negligence bill 5 and the nofault insurance bill.66 The no-fault insurance bill provided benefits to all occupants of the vehicle, regardless of their status as
paying or non-paying passengers. Thus, allowing recovery under
the proposed no-fault insurance bill would have been inconsistent
with denying recovery under the guest statute. 7 Moreover, the
that, in repealing the last of these statutes, the legislature perceived their inconsistency
with other statutes governing the conduct of drivers," Roberts v. Johnson, 91 Wash. 2d
182, 186, 588 P.2d 201, 203 (1978); and (3) "[i]n view of the fact that. . . the legislature
has manifested a disinterest in [the guest statute's] continuation . . .longevity alone
does not justify its retention." Id. at 187-88, 588 P.2d at'204 . Each of these statements
demonstrates that the court was aware of an intent to change the standard of liability.
59. See, e.g., State v. Brotherhood of Friends, 41 Wash. 2d 133, 146, 247 P.2d 787,
795 (1952); Linn v. Reid, 114 Wash. 609, 196 P. 13 (1921).
60. See, e.g., Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973);
Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751,
518 P.2d 362 (1974); PROSSER, supra note 17, at 186-87; Allen, Why Do Courts Coddle
Auto Indemnity Companies?, 61 Am. L. REy. 77 (1927); Lascher, supra note 41, at 10.
61. For a list of those states repealing their guest statutes, see D. BLASHFELD, AUTroMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE § 211.3 (1965 & Supp. 1977).
62. For a list of states that have declared their guest statutes unconstitutional, see
id.
63. See Comment, The Constitutionalityof Automobile Guest Statutes: A Roadmap
to the Recent Equal Protection Challenges, 1975 B.Y.U. L. Rzv. 99, 99 n.1.
64. "This bill should be considered a companion bill to S.B. 2045 (the comparative
negligence bill) and to the no-fault insurance bills." STAFF OF HOUSE JUDICIARY COMM., 43d
WASH. LEGis. SEss., 3d Ex. SEss., REPor ON S. 2046 (1974).
65. S. 2045, 43d Wash. Legis. Sess., 3d Ex. Sess. (1974) (codified at WASH. REv.CODE
§ 4.22.010 (1976)).
66. S. 2044, 43d Wash. Legis. Seas., 3d Ex. Sess. (1974) (this bill never passed the
Senate).
67. Under the typical no-fault statute, all guest passengers injured in the state receive
the benefits of no-fault insurance at least up to the statutory amount. An unusual anomaly
exists in states with both no-fault insurance and guest statutes. Several such states,
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host-guest rule contravenes the spirit of Washington's comparative negligence statute, 9 because the purpose behind that legislation was to avoid wholesale denial of recovery to an injured person
who was only partially responsible for the injuries sustained. The
guest statute, however, denies recovery to a guest unless the
driver was grossly negligent, even if the guest was totally faultless.
These contemporary circumstances, combined with the legislative history, offer convincing proof that the legislature attempted to change the status of the law when it repealed the
guest statute. Thus, it is sophistry to argue that in repealing the
guest statute the legislature intended to return to the common
law standard-the same standard existing prior to the repeal.6 9
In conclusion, the Roberts court's abandonment of gross negligence in favor of ordinary negligence is consistent with both the
standard of care articulated in Heiman v. Kloizner0 fifty-three
years ago, and general theories of tort liability in Washington.
Although the court has now placed Washington among the majority of jurisdictions recognizing ordinary negligence as the applicable standard of liability in host-guest automobile cases, 7 this
abandonment of gross negligence is tainted by the court's failure
to implement the legislative intent behind the 1974 repeal of
Washington's guest statute. The court, limiting itself to the text
of the repealing statute, demonstrates a misconception as to the
appropriate sources for assessing legislative intent. Extrinsic aids
realizing that it would be inequitable to allow recovery to a guest up to the statutory
maximum under the no-fault plan and yet require that he prove gross negligence for a
common law recovery, amended their guest statutes allowing a guest to recover for ordinary negligence on the part of the driver. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws. ch. 231, § 85L
(Michie/Law. Co-op Supp. 1972). See also Note, The Present Status of Automobile Guest
Statutes, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 684-85 (1974).
68. WASH. Rav. CODE § 4.22.010 (1976).
69. There is, however, another possible way to interpret the legislature's intent; that
is, the legislature intended to change the standard of liability to ordinary negligence but
had the good sense to leave the future evolution of the negligence concept to the common
law because the precise standard of care to be applied in various circumstances is an issue
that does not relate well to statutory directive. Thus, the actions of a sensitive legislature
have been frustrated by an insensitive court and an opportunity to enhance the working
relationship between the judicial and legislative institutions has been lost.
70. 139 Wash. 655, 247 P. 1034 (1926).
71. Georgia is the only remaining jurisdiction adhering to a common law requirement
of gross negligence. See Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399, 106 S.E. 297 (1921). The Georgia
Court of Appeals, stating that its common law host-guest rule was an unconstitutional
violation of both state and federal equal protection standards, concluded that it was
powerless to so hold because "[w]herever the [Georgia] Supreme Court has set up 'an
established marked line, though crooked,' we have no power to overrule it." Bickford v.
Nolen, 142 Ga. App. 256, 262, 235 S.E.2d 743, 747 (1977).
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to interpretation, such as legislative history and social context,
are tools inherently better suited than legal maxims for a sensitive assessment of legislative intent. Because the Washington
Legislature is beginning to record officially its legislative history,
the court should recognize such reliable sources and give deference to legislative intent when interpreting new, amendatory, and
repealing acts.
Mark F. Miller

